PRUComm Research Seminar on Healthcare Commissioning

NHS Commissioning Practice and Health System Governance

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Themes

- Commissioning as governance
- Power and Commissioning: England and Germany
- Implications
A policy dilemma

How to reconcile ...

- 'Hollowed out' state – and health system
  - Diversification of providers
  - Cost containment and shifting
- Political salience of NHS – bed-pan doctrine still applies
The Bedpan Doctrine

'If a bedpan is dropped on a hospital floor in Tredegar, its noise should resound in the Palace of Westminster'

Commissioning as governance 'solves' the dilemma

- Responsibilisation of local managers
- 'Depoliticisation'
- Proxy control and accountability of providers
Commissioners' governance over providers

- Several media of control in parallel
- Each one a 'technology of power' (Foucault)
- Each combination has distinct properties (a 'dispostif')
- Each combination has distinct particular effects on providers
Commissioners' media of control (power) over providers

- Managerial performance
- Negotiated order
- Discursive control
- Resource dependency – incentives
- Provider competition
- Juridical and regulatory control
Managerial performance

- Proposing contracts to potential providers
- Where permitted, select providers.
- Contract negotiation
- Audit and monitor provider performance.
- Maintain transparency of provider activities and costs
- Private sector managerial inputs (US firms, consultancies)
- Involve doctors – see below
- Imitate corporate procurement techniques?
Negotiated order

- Explicit or tacit division of labour - who participates?
- Agenda setting, framing, closure
- Explicit or tacit rights of non-interference – pay-back for participation
- When negotiations recur
- Psychological tactics
- 'Relationality' - path-dependent and structural basis
  - High trust > discursive control, transparency
  - Low trust > non-discursive control
Discursive control

**Etic**
- Evidence-based medicine
- Epidemiology
- Service and/or financial modelling

**Emic**
- Professional discipline
- Political authority
- Ideologies (religion, economics, new public management)

Depends on each side having some common discourse(s)
Resource dependency

- Creates possibility of incentives

- Depends on:
  - How resource-dependent the provider is
  - What discretion commissioner has
    - What services to finance
    - Unit of payment
    - Payment variations (bonus / penalty)
    - Conditional payments

- Spectrum: commissioner-led to passive reimbursement
Provider competition / contestability

- Accentuates provider's resource dependency
- Depends on *credible* threat of alternate provision
- Monopsony – oligopsony – competition – oligopoly - monopoly
- Commissioners strengthen their position by:
  - Inviting new providers
  - Help establish new providers
  - 'Make' for themselves instead of 'buy'
Juridical control

- Contract terms – completeness, presentation
- Appeal to
  - Regulatory and / licensing bodies
  - Political authority
  - Informal arbitrators
  - Courts (administrative, civil, constitutional)
Implications of the mode of commissioning

- Mode of commissioning = particular combination of the above media of power
- … all mediated through provider management.
- Nevertheless, differences in modes of commissioning help explain health system:
  - Patterns of provider development (medical technologies, absences of services, corporatisation, concentration of capital).
  - Capacity for cost control
  - Management of commissioning – medical involvement
  - Development, use of EBM
Research Questions

- Cross-country comparisons one way to expose and analyse modes of commissioning.

Research Questions:

- How do modes of commissioning differ between the German and English health systems?
- With what implications for market-based 'reforms', in particular future development of commissioning?
Methods

- Systematic comparison of two national case studies – England (managed competition), Germany (social health insurance).
- Data from national, commissioner and provider level in Germany and England, 2011-12
  - Interviews
  - Grey material
  - National events
  - Published data
  - Ad-hoc enquiries to experts
- Analytic framework is media-of-power schema above
- Problem of counterfactuals – what would A have otherwise done?
Management: modelling *versus* planning (1)

England (PCTs - and CCGs?)

- Plan services for geographical population
- Some collaborative commissioning
- Cash limits
- Provider opacity and/or glut of unanalysed information
- Epidemiologist + GP inputs
- Voluminous guidance on EBM - used at local level
- Transaction costs not (publicly?) known
Management: modelling versus planning (2)

Germany

- Land bed-plan constrains commissioners & providers
- Multiple social health insurers – collaborative
- Case-mix spread-sheets per hospital – negotiate, re-model, re-allocate within overall total
- SHI can recruit more subscribers
- Audit and confirmation of payments to hospital, ambulatory doctors
- Sophisticated almost real-time modelling by commissioners, e.g.
  - volumes of hip replacement revisions per provider
  - disease management programme costs and outcomes for diabetes
3. Data analysis: examples

Early reoperations
Negotiated order: Principal-agent versus consensus

England

- Except for GMS, provider negotiations are local
- Principal-agent model
- Wide, flexible remit
- Some 'micro-commissioning'

Germany

- HS framework at national, provincial levels.
- Rhein / Ordoliberal model – consensus + veto
- BG-A decides which care technologies are in tariff
- Episode-based
Discursive control: Solidarity versus authority

_Etic_
- Germany
  - detailed empirical case-mix modelling
    (D-DRG points, allocations, financial implications)
  - EBM at national level (IQWiG)

- England
  - EBM guidelines and data at all levels

_Emic_
- Germany
  - Professional discipline
  - Juridical rights and obligations (based on 'solidarity')

- England
  - Central political authority
  - New public management (neo-liberal variants)
  - Professional discipline
Incentives

- Both systems
  - DRGs for hospitals
  - Points systems for GPs (QOF, Einheitliche Bewertungsmaßstab)
  - Per-diem for certain kinds of long-term care

- England
  - Additional incentives for hospital quality (CQIN)
  - PCT (and CCG?) discretion and supplements at the margins

- Germany
  - Nearly all passive reimbursement
  - Except disease management and 'managed care' programmes
Competition

- England - NHS commissioners can choose providers
  - PCT (and CCG?) controls over/under doctored areas
  - APMS contracts
  - Exceptions – treatment centres
  - Disease management programmes
  - Patient (or GP?) choice of provider

- Germany - commissioners cannot choose providers
  - Patient choice of provider
  - All licensed episodes per provider must be paid
Juridical control

Germany
- Very complete regulations, entitlements, tariffs
- Incomplete control of clinical practice, quality
- Medizinische Dienst and Schiedstelle arbitration + courts.

England
- Fairly complete GMS contract
- Other contracts – national framework + 'white spaces'
- NHS contracts – Secretary of State arbitrates
- Courts – only for non NHS providers
Implications - Modes of commissioning

- Surrogate planning ← 'competitive bidding' quasi-market architecture
- Case-mix commissioning ← 'social insurance' quasi-market architecture
- Client-based commissioning – includes 'primary doctor purchasing' quasi-market architecture
- Others exist
## Modes of commissioning, media of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case-mix commissioning</th>
<th>Surrogate planning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managerial Performance</strong></td>
<td>Service planning for geographical population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case-mix modelling + audit + subscriber marketing.</td>
<td>Principal-agent + micro-commissioning</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiated order</strong></td>
<td>Principal-agent + micro-commissioning</td>
</tr>
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<td>Consensus, multi-stakeholder model + Episode-based.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Financial incentives</strong></td>
<td>Pay for performance (defined prospectively) + ad_hoc + fixed tariffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed tariffs.</td>
<td>Competition or bilateral monopoly.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Provider competition</strong></td>
<td>Competition or bilateral monopoly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None: referral 'framing' at most.</td>
<td>Unwritten constitution + common law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juridical.</strong></td>
<td>Unwritten constitution + common law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive regulation + administrative law</td>
<td>Unwritten constitution + common law.</td>
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To what effect?

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<th>Surrogate planning</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence based practice</strong></td>
<td>Constrained by tariff</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Care integration</strong></td>
<td>Provider 'silos' + experimental projects</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Patient choice</strong></td>
<td>Universal</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Care quality, safety</strong></td>
<td>High, occasional scandals</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cost control</strong></td>
<td>Low – only within 'corridors'</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy-responsiveness</strong></td>
<td>Low: negotiative + Last-resort political interventions</td>
</tr>
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A few more dilemmas

- Case-mix based commissioning – German commissioners cannot exploit provider competition …
- … *because* there is patient choice of provider
- Cost control requires less provision, competition requires redundancy
- Different sub-modes of commissioning seem to be required for different care groups
Questions? Comments?