Tag Archives: commissioning

Understanding Primary Care Co-Commissioning: Uptake, Development, and Impacts. Final report (March 2018)

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 gave the power and responsibility for commissioning health services and budgets to groups of GP practices called Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). CCGs will commission the great majority of NHS services for their patients but will not be directly responsible for commissioning services that GPs themselves provide. The responsibility for commissioning primary care services (medical, dental, eye health, and pharmacy) was given to a new statutory organisation called NHS England (NHSE), known as the NHS Commissioning Board in statute. This was to ensure a more standardised model and consistency in the management of the four groups.

In May 2014, following Simon Stevens appointment as the Chief Executive of NHS England, CCGs were delegated the responsibilities to commission primary care services. This was to enable better integrated care outside hospitals, ensure that primary, community and mental health are properly resourced, and CCGs having more influence over how funding is invested for local population, which would ensure sustainability of their local NHS. Co-commissioning would also enable the development of new models of care such as multispecialty community providers (MCPs) and primary and acute care systems (PACSs), as set out in the NHS Five Year Forward View.

This report presents the findings from a study following the development of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in England. This is the third phase of the project, which aims to understand the ways in which CCGs are responding to their new primary care co-commissioning responsibilities from April 2015, providing feedback to NHSE supporting CCGs going through the approval process.

The study provides detailed evidence about the experiences of CCGs as they took on delegated responsibility for primary care commissioning. The study took place between May 2015 to June 2017. The strength of this study lies in the bringing together of evidence from senior policy makers as to the overall objectives for the policy with both telephone survey and case study evidence as to how it is playing out in practice. The specific research questions addressed in this report are:

  • What is the scope of co-commissioning activity and the process of change?
  • What approaches have been taken by CCGs to:
    • Develop governance structure to oversee primary care co-commissioning?
    • Commissioning and contracting?
    • Manage and develop the relationships between CCGs and their membership and between CCGs and external stakeholders?
    • Manage conflicts of interest?
  • What are the impacts and outcomes CCGs would expect from taking on delegated responsibility and claims of early successes?
  • What factors have affected CCGs’ progress and development?

Download report [pdf]>>

Download executive summary [pdf]>>

 

Planning and managing primary care services: lessons from the NHS in England

It is generally agreed that access to high-quality primary care is vital in the quest to provide the best possible health care at the lowest cost. Finding new ways to deliver and extend access to primary care services is of high priority in many health systems. The UK is no exception, and the past 30 years has seen a wide range of initiatives focused on primary care—particularly services provided by primary care physicians: GPs. Some initiatives have focused on payment models, altering contracts in an effort to change behaviour. Others have focused on the planning side, repeatedly enlarging, shrinking and reorganizing the organizations with responsibility for commissioning/purchasing primary care services on behalf of a population. In this paper we explore the latest of these policy and organizational changes, presenting the findings from an empirical study investigating recent changes to the commissioning of primary care services in England. Using an historical account of mechanisms to plan and manage GP services in England, we identify some of the issues involved. We explore the espoused logic underpinning the current reforms, and present early evidence about their implementation, highlighting the extent to which they may meet official aims and address the identified issues. The contribution offered is twofold:

  • First, we offer an account of the development of planning and management of GP services in England, bringing clarity to a complex field and providing valuable evidence for those responsible for overseeing primary care services in the UK and internationally.
  • Second, our exploration of the implementation of the latest round of reforms provides some lessons about the interplay between local, regional and national planning, and about the ways in which policy is made and implemented.

Read the paper >>

PRUComm Annual Research Seminar

Since the establishment of PRUComm in 2011 our research has focused on examining how the changes to the English NHS and public health system have developed. We continue to examine the development of CCGs and the new commissioning structures. We have also been exploring the mechanisms by which commissioning is undertaken, such as contracting and the use of competition and cooperation within the new system.

While most media attention has focused on changes to the commissioning and delivery of healthcare, the shift of public health to local authorities was a major part of the reforms introduced in April 2013. We have examined the progress and developments in the public health system with a particular emphasis on how governance and organisational structures develop and whether being embedded within local councils changes the way that public health services are provided. We have also been focusing on primary and community health care with recent projects examining general practice – including methods of funding primary care; research on recruitment and retention; QOF, scaling up primary care and running and analysing two rounds of the GP WorkLife survey (eight and nine).

Our research on CCGs has most recently focused on primary care co-commissioning and new forms of contracting, such as outcomes-based and alliancing. Given the increasing policy emphasis on this area of healthcare we anticipate that we will be increasingly involved in further research on primary and community healthcare. All these topics will be explored in today’s seminar with presentations by researchers from PRUComm.

Programme and speakers biographies [pdf]>>

Agenda

9.30 Registration and refreshments

10.00 – Welcome and introduction: Professor Stephen Peckham (Director PRUComm).

10.00 – 10.25 Jonathan Walden: (Commissioning Policy Lead): Policy update – Department of Health and Social Care priorities.  Slides [pdf]>>

10.25– 11.00 Dr Lindsay Forbes: Incentivising GPs: Review of the Quality and Outcomes Framework in England. Slides [pdf]>>

11.00 – 11.20 Coffee

11.20 – 12.00 Dr Jon Gibson and Prof Kath Checkland: Satisfaction, sources of stress and intentions to quit amongst GPs in England: the results of the 9th GP Worklife survey

12.00 – 12.40 Dr Marie Sanderson: Examining the implementation of new models of contracting in the NHS: what are the lessons for the formation of Accountable Care Systems?

12.40 – 13.20 Lunch

13.20 – 14.00 Dr Valerie Moran: How are CCGs managing conflicts of interest when they commission primary care? Lessons for Accountable Care. Slides [pdf]>>

14.00 – 15.50 Panel Discussion – STPs, and ACS’s the re-emergence of planning?

15.50 – 16.00 Professor Stephen Peckham: Current PRUComm research programme

16.00 Close

How are CCGs managing conflicts of interest under primary care co-commissioning in England? A qualitative analysis

Abstract

Objectives From April 2015, NHS England (NHSE) started to devolve responsibility for commissioning primary care services to clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). The aim of this paper is to explore how CCGs are managing potential conflicts of interest associated with groups of GPs commissioning themselves or their practices to provide services.

Design We carried out two telephone surveys using a sample of CCGs. We also used a qualitative case study approach and collected data using interviews and meeting observations in four sites (CCGs).

Setting/participants We conducted 57 telephone interviews and 42 face-to-face interviews with general practitioners (GPs) and CCG staff involved in primary care co-commissioning and observed 74 meetings of CCG committees responsible for primary care co-commissioning.

Results Conflicts of interest were seen as an inevitable consequence of CCGs commissioning primary care. Particular problems arose with obtaining unbiased clinical input for new incentive schemes and providing support to GP provider federations. Participants in meetings concerning primary care co-commissioning declared conflicts of interest at the outset of meetings. Different approaches were pursued regarding GPs involvement in subsequent discussions and decisions with inconsistency in the exclusion of GPs from meetings. CCG senior management felt confident that the new governance structures and policies dealt adequately with conflicts of interest, but we found these arrangements face limitations. While the revised NHSE statutory guidance on managing conflicts of interest (2016) was seen as an improvement on the original (2014), there still remained some confusion over various terms and concepts contained therein.

Conclusions Devolving responsibility for primary care co-commissioning to CCGs created a structural conflict of interest. The NHSE statutory guidance should be refined and clarified so that CCGs can properly manage conflicts of interest. Non-clinician members of committees involved in commissioning primary care require training in order to make decisions requiring clinical input in the absence of GPs.

Read the BMJ Open article >>

Read the blog>>

Commissioning through competition and cooperation in the English NHS under the Health and Social Care Act 2012: evidence from a qualitative study of four clinical commissioning groups

Abstract

Objective The Health and Social Care Act 2012 (‘HSCA 2012’) introduced a new, statutory, form of regulation of competition into the National Health Service (NHS), while at the same time recognising that cooperation was necessary. NHS England’s policy document, The Five Year Forward View (‘5YFV’) of 2014 placed less emphasis on competition without altering the legislation. We explored how commissioners and providers understand the complex regulatory framework, and how they behave in relation to competition and cooperation.

Design We carried out detailed case studies in four clinical commissioning groups, using interviews and documentary analysis to explore the commissioners’ and providers’ understanding and experience of competition and cooperation.

Setting/participants We conducted 42 interviews with senior managers in commissioning organisations and senior managers in NHS and independent provider organisations (acute and community services).

Results Neither commissioners nor providers fully understand the regulatory regime in respect of competition in the NHS, and have not found that the regulatory authorities have provided adequate guidance. Despite the HSCA 2012 promoting competition, commissioners chose mainly to use collaborative strategies to effect major service reconfigurations, which is endorsed as a suitable approach by providers. Nevertheless, commissioners are using competitive tendering in respect of more peripheral services in order to improve quality of care and value for money.

Conclusions Commissioners regard the use of competition and cooperation as appropriate in the NHS currently, although collaborative strategies appear more helpful in respect of large-scale changes. However, the current regulatory framework contained in the HSCA 2012, particularly since the publication of the 5YFV, is not clear. Better guidance should be issued by the regulatory authorities.

Link to the BMJ Open article>>

PRUComm Research Review 2017

This is our fifth annual review of research and provides a brief overview of our research activities. Following confirmation last year of our extension until the end of 2018 we have now agreed a programme of work with the Department. This sees a stronger shift towards exploring the impact of system changes on commissioning. The introduction of Sustainability and Transformation Plans and new metapractice organisations creates a rapidly shifting landscape for the commissioning and delivery of healthcare in England.

Download report [pdf]>> 

Commissioning for health improvement following the 2012 health and social care reforms in England: what has changed?

Abstract

Background

The wide-ranging program of reforms brought about by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) in England fundamentally changed the operation of the public health system, moving responsibility for the commissioning and delivery of services from the National Health Service to locally elected councils and a new national public health agency. This paper explores the ways in which the reforms have altered public health commissioning.

Methods

We conducted multi-methods research over 33 months, incorporating national surveys of Directors of Public Health and local council elected members at two time-points, and in-depth case studies in five purposively selected geographical areas.

Results

Public health commissioning responsibilities have changed and become more fragmented, being split amongst a range of different organisations, most of which were newly created in 2013. There is much change in the way public health commissioning is done, in who is doing it, and in what is commissioned, since the reforms. There is wider consultation on decisions in the local council setting than in the NHS, and elected members now have a strong influence on public health prioritisation. There is more (and different) scrutiny being applied to public health contracts, and most councils have embarked on wide-ranging changes to the health improvement services they commission. Public health money is being used in different ways as councils are adapting to increasing financial constraint.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that, while some of the intended opportunities to improve population health and create a more joined-up system with clearer leadership have been achieved, fragmentation, dispersed decision-making and uncertainties regarding funding remain significant challenges. There have been profound changes in commissioning processes, with consequences for what health improvement services are ultimately commissioned. Time (and further research) will tell if any of these changes lead to improved population health outcomes and reduced health inequalities, but many of the opportunities brought about by the reforms are threatened by the continued flux in the system.

Link to the article [BMC open access] >>

Alliance contracting, prime contracting and outcome based contracting: What can the NHS learn from elsewhere? A literature review

This report is part of the research of the Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the Health Care System (PRUComm) on new models of contracting in the NHS, commissioned by the Department of Health.

Over the past few years the need to find new ways to integrate services has become an important policy priority in the English NHS. The formation of new organisational configurations in local health economies announced in the Five Year Forward View entails separate organisations working closely together to improve the integration of local services and allow the better use of resources. One way to achieve collaboration across organisational boundaries is through the adoption of new models of contracting, such as alliance contracting, prime provider contracting and outcome based contracting. Despite their relative novelty in the English NHS, these models have a history of use in other sectors such as construction and defence, as well as in the commissioning of public services in the UK and overseas.

This report summarises the findings of a literature review of the available evidence concerning the characteristics of these new contractual models and their implementation in other sectors. The available evidence is considered in order to draw out the lessons which may be learnt to aid the implementation of these models in the English NHS.

Download report [pdf]>>

Interrogating institutional change: Actors’ attitudes to competition and cooperation in commissioning health services in England

Since the beginning of the 1990s the public healthcare system in England has been subject to reforms. This has resulted in a structurally hybrid system of public service with elements of the market. Utilizing a theory of new institutionalism, this article explores National Health Service (NHS) managers’ views on competition and cooperation as mechanisms for commissioning health services. We interrogate the extent of institutional change in the NHS by examining managers’ understanding of the formal rules, normative positions and frameworks for action under the regime of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Interviews with managers showed an overall preference for cooperative approaches, but also evidence of marketization in the normative outlook and actions. This suggests that hybridity in the NHS has already spread from structure and rules to other institutional pillars. The study showed that managers were adept at navigating the complex policy environment despite its inherent contradictions.

Link to the paper>>

Engaging GPs in commissioning: Realist evaluation of the early experiences of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the English NHS

Objectives To explore the ‘added value’ that general practitioners (GPs) bring to commissioning in the English NHS. We describe the experience of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the context of previous clinically led commissioning policy initiatives.

Methods Realist evaluation. We identified the programme theories underlying the claims made about GP ‘added value’ in commissioning from interviews with key informants. We tested these theories against observational data from four case study sites to explore whether and how these claims were borne out in practice.

Results The complexity of CCG structures means CCGs are quite different from one another with different distributions of responsibilities between the various committees. This makes it difficult to compare CCGs with one another. Greater GP involvement was important but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most value. We identified some of the mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the ‘added value’ that GPs bring to commissioning.

Conclusion To maximize the value of clinical input, CCGs need to invest time and effort in preparing those involved, ensuring that they systematically gather evidence about service gaps and problems from their members, and engaging members in debate about the future shape of services.

Download paper [pdf]>>